PL
An / Examination / into the / leading principles / of
the / Federal Constitution / proposed by the late / Con-
vention / held at Philadelphia. / With / Answers to the
principal objections / that have been raised against the
system. / By a Citizen of America. / — Ut patria sua
felicitate caeteris praestaret, efficit. / Xenoph. Lacedaem.
Resp. / Philadelphia : / Printed and sold by Prichard &
Hall, in Market Street, / the second door above Laetitia
Court. / M.DCC.LXXXVII.
8vo., pp. 55.
Written by Noah Webster. This is reprinted from his own
copy of the pamphlet, and the foot notes in brakets show his
corrections and additions.
"This is a hasty production, written at the request of
Mr. Fitzsimmons, of Philadelphia, a member of the Conven-
tion."— Indorsement by Noah Webster.
P. L. F.
Avery Architectural and Fine Arts Library
Gift of Seymour B. Durst Old York Library
TO
HIS EXCELLENCY
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Escl.
PRESIDENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA,
AND
MEMBER OF THE LATE CONVENTION,
HELD AT PHILADELPHIA FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DEVISING A CONSTITUTION FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE FOLLOWING REMARKS UPON THE SYSTEM
RECOMMENDED BY THAT CONVENTION,
ARE MOST HUMBLY INSCRIBED
BY
HIS EXCELLENCY'S
MOST OBEDIENT
HUMBLE SERVANT,
THE AUTHOR.
Philadelphia, )
October jo, 1787. )
. .WHZ
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/examinationintolOOwebs
/^\F all the memorable aeras that have marked the progress
of men from the savage state to the refinements of lux-
ury, that which has combined them into society, under a wise
system of government, and given form to a nation, has ever
been recorded and celebrated as the most important. Legis-
lators have ever been deemed the greatest benefactors of man-
kind— respected when living, and often deified after their
death. Hence the fame of Fohi and Confucius — of Moses,
Solon and Lycurgus — of Romulus and Numa — of Alfred,
Peter the Great, and Mango Capac ; whose names will be cel-
ebrated through all ages, for framing and improving constitu-
tions of government, which introduced order into society and
secured the benefits of law to millions of the human race.
This western world now beholds an aera important beyond
conception, and which posterity will number with the age of
Czar of Muscovy, and with the promulgation of the Jewish
laws at Mount Sinai. The names of those men who have
digested a system of constitutions for the American empire,
will be enrolled with those of Zamolxis and Odin, and cele-
brated by posterity with the honors which less enlightened
nations have paid to the fabled demi-gods of antiquity.
[6] But the origin of the American REPUBLIC is distin-
guished by peculiar circumstances. Other nations have been
driven together by fear and necessity — the governments have
generally been the result of a single man's observations; or
the offspring of particular interests. In the formation of our
constitution, the wisdom of all ages is collected — the legisla-
tors of antiquity are consulted — as well as the opinions and
interests of the millions who are concerned. In short, it is an
empire of reason.
In the formation of such a government, it is not only the
right, but the indispensable duty of every citizen to examine
the principles of it, to compare them with the principles of
other governments, with a constant eye to our particular situ-
6
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER,
ation and circumstances, and thus endeavor to foresee the
future operations of our own system, and its effects upon
human happiness.
Convinced of this truth, I have no apology to offer for the
following remarks, but an earnest desire to be useful to my
country.
In attending to the proposed Federal Constitution, the
first thing that presents itself to our consideration, is the
division of the legislative into two branches. This article has
so many advocates in America, that it needs not any vindi-
cation.*— But it has its opposers, among whom are some
respectable characters, especially in Pennsylvania ; for which
reason, I will state [7] some of the arguments and facts which
incline me to favor the proposed division.
On the first view of men in society, we should suppose
that no man would be bound by a law to which he had not
given his consent. Such would be our first idea of political
obligation. But experience, from time immemorial, has proved
it to be impossible to unite the opinions of all the members of
a community, in every case ; and hence the doctrine, that the
opinions of a majority must give law to the whole State : a
doctrine as universally received, as any intuitive truth.
Another idea that naturally presents itself to our minds,
on a slight consideration of the subject, is, that in a perfect
government, all the members of a society should be present,
and each give his suffrage in acts of legislation, by which he
is to be bound. This is impracticable in large states ; and
even were it not, it is very questionable whether it would be
the best mode of legislation. It was however practised in the
free states of antiquity ; and was the cause of innumerable
evils. To avoid these evils, the moderns have invented the
doctrine of representation, which seems to be the perfection of
human government.
Another idea, which is very natural, is, that to complete
the mode of legislation, all the representatives should be col-
lected into one body, for the purpose of debating questions
and enacting laws. Speculation would suggest the idea ;
* A division of the legislature has been adopted in the new constitution of
every state except Pennsylvania and Georgia.
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
7
[8] and the desire of improving upon the systems of govern-
ment in the old world, would operate powerfully in its favor.
But men are ever running into extremes. The passions,
after a violent constraint, are apt to run into licentiousness ;
and even the reason of men, who have experienced evils from
the defects of a government, will sometimes coolly condemn
the whole system.
Every person, moderately acquainted with human nature,
knows that public bodies, as well as individuals, are liable to
the influence of sudden and violent passions, under the oper-
ation of which, the voice of reason is silenced. Instances of
such influence are not so frequent, as in individuals ; but its
effects are extensive in proportion to the numbers that com-
pose the public body. This fact suggests the expediency of
dividing the powers of legislation between the two bodies of
men, whose debates shall be separate and not dependent on
each other; that, if at any time, one part should appear to be
under any undue influence, either from passion, obstinacy,
jealousy of particular men, attachment to a popular speaker,
or other extraordinary causes, there might be a power in the
legislature sufficient to check every pernicious measure. Even
in a small republic, composed of men, equal in property and
abilities, and all meeting for the purpose of making laws, like
the old Romans in the field of Mars, a division of the body
into two independent branches, would be a necessary step to
prevent the disorders, which arise from [9] the pride, irritability
and stubborness of mankind. This will ever be the case,
while men possess passions, easily inflamed, which may bias
their reason and lead them to erroneous conclusions.
Another consideration has weight : A single body of men
may be led astray by one person of abilities and address,
who, on the first starting a proposition, may throw a plausible
appearance on one side of the question, and give a lead to the
whole debate. To prevent any ill consequence from such a
circumstance, a separate discussion, before a different body of
men, and taken up on new grounds, is a very eligible expedient.
Besides, the design of a senate is not merely to check the
legislative assembly, but to collect wisdom and experience.
3
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
In most of our constitutions, and particularly in the proposed
federal system, greater age and longer residence are required
to qualify for the senate, than for the house of representa-
tives. This is a wise provision. The house of representatives
may be composed of new and unexperienced members —
strangers to the forms of proceeding, and the science of legis-
lation. But either positive institutions, or customs, which
may supply their place, fill the senate with men venerable for
age and respectability, experienced in the ways of men, and
in the art of governing, and who are not liable to the bias of
passions that govern the young. If the senate of Rhode
Island is an exception to this observation, it is a proof that
the mass of the people are corrupted, and that the senate
should be elected [10] less frequently than the other house :
Had the old senate in Rhode Island held their seats for three
years ; had they not been chosen, amidst a popular rage for
paper money, the honor of that state would probably have
been saved. The old senate would have stopped the measure
for a year or two, till the people could have had time to
deliberate upon its consequences. I consider it as a capital
excellence of the proposed constitution, that the senate can
be wholly renewed but once in six years.
Experience is the best instructor — it is better than a thou-
sand theories. The history of every government on earth
affords proof of the utility of different branches in a legisla-
ture. But I appeal only to our own experience in America.
To what cause can we ascribe the absurd measures of Con-
gress, in times past, and the speedy recision of whole meas-
ures, but to the want of some check? I feel the most
profound deference for that honorable body, and perfect
respect for their opinions ; but some of their steps betray a
great want of consideration — a defect, which perhaps nothing
can remedy, but a division of their deliberations. I will in-
stance only their resolution to build a Federal Town. When
we were involved in a debt, of which we could hardly pay the
interest, and when Congress could not command a shilling,
the very proposition was extremely absurd. Congress them-
selves became ashamed of the resolution, and rescinded it
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
9
with as much silence as possible. Many other acts of that
body are equally reprehensible — but respect forbids me to
mention them.
[n] Several states, since the war, have experienced the
necessity of a division of the legislature. Maryland was saved
from a most pernicious measure, by her senate. A rage for
paper money, bordering on madness, prevailed in their house
of delegates — an emission of 500,000 was proposed ; a sum
equal to the circulating medium of the State. Had the sum
been emitted, every shilling of specie would have been driven
from circulation, and most of it from the state. Such a loss
would not have been repaired in seven years — not to mention
the whole catalogue of frauds which would have followed the
measure. The senate, like honest, judicious men, and the
protectors of the interests of the state, firmly resisted the
rage, and gave the people time to cool and to think. Their
resistance was effectual — the people acquiesced, and the honor
and interest of the state were secured.
The house of representatives in Connecticut, soon after the
war, had taken offence at a certain act of Congress. The
upper house, who understood the necessity and expediency of
the measure, better than the people, refused to concur in a
remonstrance to Congress. Several other circumstances gave
umbrage to the lower house ; and to weaken or destroy the
influence of the senate, the representatives, among other vio-
lent proceedings, resolved, not merely to remove the seat of
government, but to make every county town in the state the
seat of government, by rotation. This foolish resolution
would have disgraced school-boys — the senate saved the
honor of the state, by rejecting it with disdain — [12] and within
two months, every representative was ashamed of the conduct
of the house. All public bodies have these fits of passion,
when their conduct seems to be perfectly boyish ; and in these
paroxisms, a check is highly necessary.
Pennsylvania exhibits many instances of this hasty con-
duct. At one session of the legislature, an armed force is
ordered, by a precipitate resolution, to expel the settlers at
Wioming from their possessions — at a succeeding session, the
IO
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
same people are confirmed in their possessions. At one ses-
sion, a charter is wrested from a corporation — at another,
restored. The whole state is split into parties — everything is
decided by party — any proposition from one side of the house,
is sure to be damned by the other — and when one party per-
ceives the other has the advantage, they play truant — and an
officer or a mob hunt the absconding members in all the
streets and alleys in town. Such farces have been repeated
in Philadelphia — and there alone. Had the legislature been
framed with some check upon rash proceedings, the honor of
the state would have been saved — the party spirit would have
died with the measures proposed in the legislature. But now,
any measure may be carried by party in the house ; it then
becomes a law, and sows the seeds of dissension throughout
the state.*
[13] A thousand examples similar to the foregoing may
be produced, both in ancient and modern history. Many
plausible things may be said in favor of pure democracy —
many in favor of uniting the representatives of the people in
one single house — but uniform experience proves both to be
inconsistent with the peace of society, and the rights of free-
men.
The state of Georgia has already discovered such incon-
veniences in its constitution, that a proposition has been made
for altering it ; and there is a prospect that a revisal will take
place.
People who have heard and read of the European govern-
ments, founded on the different ranks of monarch, nobility and
people, seem to view the senate in America, where there is no
difference of ranks and titles, as a useless branch — or as a ser-
vile imitation of foreign constitutions of governmeut, without
the same reasons. This is a capital mistake. Our senates, it
* I cannot help remarking the singular jealousy of the constitution of
Pennsylvania, which requires that a bill shall be published for the considera-
tion of the people, before it is enacted into a law, except in extraordinary
cases. This annihilates, the legislature, and reduces it to an advisory body.
It almost wholly supersedes the uses of representation, the most excellent im-
provement in modern governments. Besides the absurdity of constituting a
legislature, without supreme power, such a system will keep the state perpetu-
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
II
is true, are not composed of a different order of men ; but the
same reasons, the same necessity for distinct branches of the
legislature exists in all governments. But in most of our
American constitutions, we have all the advantages of checks
and balance, without the danger which may arise [14] from a
superior and independent order of men.
It is worth our while to institute a brief comparison be-
tween our American forms of government, and the two best
constitutions that ever existed in Europe, the Roman and the
British.
In England, the king or supreme executive officer, is
hereditary. In America, the president of the United States,
is elective. That this is an advantage will hardly be dis-
puted.-
In ancient Rome, the king was elective, and so were the
consuls, who were the executive officers in the republic. But
they were elected by the body of the people, in their public
assemblies; and this circumstance paved the way for such ex-
cessive bribery and corruption as are wholly unknown in
modern times. The president of the United States is also
elective ; but by a few men chosen by the several legisla-
tures under their inspection separated at a vast dis-
tance and holding no office under the United States.
Such a mode of election almost precludes the possibility of
corruption. Besides, no state however large, has the power
of chusing a president in that state ; for each elector must
choose at least one man, who is not an inhabitant of that State
to which he belongs.
The crown of England is hereditary — the consuls of Rome
were chosen annually — both these extremes are guarded
against in our proposed constitution. The president is not
ally embroiled. It carries the spirit of discussion into all quarters, without
the means of reconciling the opinions of men, who are not assembled to hear
each others' arguments. They debate with themselves— form their own opin-
ions, without the reasons which influence others, and without the means of
information. Thus the warmth of different opinions, which, in other states,
dies in the legislature, is diffused through the state of Pennsylvania, and be-
comes personal and permanent. The seeds of dissension are sown in the con-
stitution, and no state, except Rhode Island, is so distracted by factions.
12 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
dis- [15] missed from his office, as soon as he is acquainted
with business — he continues four years, and is re-eligible, if
the people approve his conduct. Nor can he canvass for his
office, by reason of the distance of the electors ; and the pride
and jealousy of the states will prevent his continuing too long
in office.
The age requisite to qualify for this office is thirty-five
years.* The age requisite for admittance to the Roman con-
sulship was forty-three years. For this difference, good rea-
sons may be assigned — the improvements in science, and
particularly in government, render it practicable for a man to
qualify himself for an important office, much earlier in life?
than he could among the Romans ; especially in the early
part of their commonwealth, when the office was instituted.
Besides it is very questionable whether any inconvenience
would have attended admission to the consulship at an earlier
age. [f]
The powers vested in the president resemble the powers
of the supreme magistrates in Rome. They are not so exten-
sive as those of the British king; but in one instance, the
president, with concurrence of the senate, has powers exceed-
ing those of the Roman consuls ; I mean in the appointment
of judges and other subordinate executive officers. The prae-
tors or judges in Rome were chosen annually by the people.
This was a defect in the Roman government. [16] One half
the evils in a state arise from a lax execution of the laws ; and
it is impossible that an executive officer can act with vigor
and impartiality, when his office depends on the popular voice.
An annual popular election of executive officers is the sure
source of a negligent, partial and corrupt administration. The
independence of the judges in England has produced a course
of the most just, impartial and energetic judicial decisions, for
many centuries, that can be exhibited in any nation on earth.
In this point therefore I conceive the plan proposed in Amer-
ica to be an improvement on the Roman constitution. In all
* In the decline of the republic, bribery or military force obtained this
office for persons who had not attained this age — Augustus was chosen at the
age of twenty; or rather obtained it with his sword.
[f "Query."]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
13
free governments, that is, in all countries, where laws govern ,
and not men, the supreme magistrate should have it in his
power to execute any law, however unpopular, without haz-
arding his person or office. The laws are the sole guardians
of right, and when the magistrate dares not act, every person
is insecure.
Let us now attend to the constitution and the powers of
the senate.
The house of lords in England is wholly independent on [f ]
the people. The lords spiritual hold their seats by office; and
the people at large have no voice in disposing of the ecclesias-
tical dignities. The temporal lords hold their seats by heredi-
tary right or by grant from the king: And it is a branch of
the king's prerogative to make what peers he pleases.
[17] The senate in Rome was elective ; but a senator held
his seat for life.*
[fof]
* I say the senate was elective — but this must be understood with some
exceptions; or rather qualifications. The constitution of the Roman senate has
been a subject of enquiry, with the first men in modern ages. Lord Chester-
field requested the opinion of the learned Vertot, upon the manner of chusing
senators in Rome; and it was a subject of discussion between Lord Harvey and
Dr. Middleton. The most probable account of the manner of forming the se-
nate, and filling up vacancies, which I have collected from the best writers on
this subject, is here abridged for the consideration of the reader.
Romulus chose one hundred persons, from the principal families in Rome,
to form a council or senate; and reserved to himself the right of nominating
their successors ; that is of filling vacancies. "Mais comme Romulus avoit lui
" m£me choisi les premiers senateurs il se reserva le droit de nommer a son
" gre, leurs successeurs." — Mably, sur les Romains. Other well informed his-
torians intimate that Romulus retained the right of nominating the president
only. After the union of the Sabines with the Romans, Romulus added an-
other hundred members to the senate, but by consent of the people. Tarquin,
the ancient, added another hundred; but historians are silent as to the manner.
On the destruction of Alba by Hostilius, some of the principal Alban fam-
ilies were added to the senate, by consent of the senate and people.
After the demolition of the monarchy, Appius Claudius was admitted into
the senate by order of the people.
Cicero testifies that, from the extinction of the monarchy, all the members
of the senate were admitted by command of the people.
It is observable that the first creation of the senators was the act ot the
monarch; and the first patrician families claimed the sole right of admission
14 EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
[18] The proposed senate in America is constituted on prin-
ples more favorable to liberty : The members are elective, and
by the separate legislatures : They hold their seats for six
years — they are thus rendered sufficiently dependent on their
constituents; and yet are not dismissed from their office as
soon as they become acquainted with the forms of proceeding.
It may be objected by the larger states, that the represen-
tation is not equal; the smallest states having the privilege of
sending the same number of senators as the largest. To obvi-
ate this objection, I would suggest but two or three ideas.
I. If each state had a representation and a right in deciding
questions, proportional to its property, three states would
almost command the whole. Such a constitution would grad-
ually annihilate the small states ; and finally melt down the
whole United States into one undivided sovereignty. The
free states of Spain and the heptarchy in England, afford strik_
ing examples of this.
[19] Should it be said that such an event is desirable, I answer;
the states are all entitled to their respective sovereignties,
and while they claim independence in international jurisdic-
tion, the federal constitution ought to guarantee their sover-
eignty.
into the senate. " Les families qui descendoient des deux cent senateurs que
" Romulus avoit crees, — se crurent seules en droit d'entrer dans le senat." —
Mably
This right however was not granted in its utmost extent ; for many of the
senators in the Roman commonwealth, were taken from plebian families. For
sixty years before the institution of the censorship, which was A. U. C. 31 J, we
are not informed how vacancies in the senate were supplied. The most proba-
ble method was this ; to enrol, in the list of senators, the different magistrates;
viz., the consuls, praetors, the two quaetors of patrician families, the five tri-
bunes (afterwards ten) and the two aediles of plebian families: The office of
quaestor gave an immediate admission into the senate. The tribunes were ad-
mitted two years after their creation. This enrollment seems to have been a
matter of course; and likewise their confirmation by the people in their comitia
or assemblies.
On extraordinary occasions, when the vacancies of the senate were numer-
ous, the consuls used to nominate some of the most respectable of the eques-
trian order, to be chosen by the people.
On the institution of the censorship, the censors were invested with full
powers to inspect the manners of the citizens, — enrol them in their proper
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
Another consideration has weight — There is, in all nations,
a tendency toward an accumulation of power in some point.
It is the business of the legislator to establish some barriers
to check the tendency. In small societies, a man worth
100,000 has but one vote, when his neighbors, who are
worth but fifty pounds, have each one vote likewise. To make
property the sole basis of authority, would expose many of the
best citizens to violence and oppression. To make the num-
ber of inhabitants [*] in a state, the rule of apportioning
power, is more epuitable ; and were the United States one
indivisible interest, would be a perfect rule for representation.
But the detached situation of the states has created some sep-
arate interests — some local institutions, which they will not
resign nor throw into the hands of other states. For these
peculiar interests, the states have an equal attachment — for the
preservation and enjoyment of these, an equal sovereignty is
necessary ; and the sovereignty of each state would not be
secure, had each state, in both branches of the legislature an
authority in passing laws, proportioned to its inhabitants.
3. But the senate should be considered as representing the
ranks according to their property, — make out lists of the senators and leave
out the names of such as had rendered themselves unworthy of their dignity
by any scandalous vices. This power they several times exercised ; but the
disgraced senators had an appeal to the people.
After the senate had lost half its members in the war with Hannibal, the
dictator, M. Fabius Buteo, filled up the number with the magistrates, with those
who had been honored with a civic crown, or others who were respectable for
age and character. One hundred and seventy new members were added at
once, with the approbation of the people. The vacancies occasioned by Sylla's
proscriptions amounted to three hundred, which were supplied by persons nom-
inated by Sylla and chosen by the people.
Before the time of the Gracchi, the number of senators did not exceed three
hundred. But in Sylla's time, so far as we can collect from direct testimonies,
it amounted to about five hundred. The age necessary to qualify for aseat in
the senate is not exactly ascertained ; but several circumstances prove it to
have been about thirty years.
See Vertot, Mably, and Middleton on this subject.
In the last ages of Roman splendor, the property requisite to qualify a
person for a senator, was settled by Augustus at eight hundred sestertia — more
than six thousand pounds sterling.
[* "Between states, and excluding negroes," added in author's copy. — P. L. F.}
i6
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
confederacy in a body. It is a [20] false principle in the vulgar
idea of representation, that a man delegated by a particular
district in a state, is the representative of that district only ;
whereas in truth a member of the legislature from any town
or county, is the representative of the whole state. In pass-
ing laws, he is to view the whole collective interest of the
state, and act from that view ; not from a partial regard to the
interest of the town or county where he is chosen.
The same principle extends to the Congress of the United
States. A delegate is bound to represent the true local inter,
est of his constituents — to state in its true light to the whole
body — but when each provincial interest is thus stated, every
member should act for the aggregate interest of the whole
confederacy. The design of representation is to bring the
collective interest into view — a delegate is not the legislator
of a single state — he is as much the legislator of the whole
confederacy as of the particular state where he is chosen ; and
if he gives his vote for a law which he believes to be beneficial
to his own state only, and pernicious to the rest, he betrays
his trust and violates his oath. It is indeed difficult for a man
to divest himself of local attachments and act from an impar-
tial regard to the general good ; but he who cannot for the
most part do this, is not a good legislator.
These considerations suggest the propriety of continuing
the senators in office, for a longer period, than the representa-
tives. They gradually lose their partiality, generalize their
views, [21] and consider themselves as acting for the whole
confederacy. Hence in the senate we may expect union and
firmness — here we may find the general good the object of leg-
islation, and a check upon the more partial and interested acts
of the other branch.
These considerations obviate the complaint, that the repre-
sentation in the senate is not equal ; for the senators represent
the whole confederacy; and all that is wanted of the members
is information of the true situation and interest of each state.
As they act under the direction of the several legislatures,
two men may as fully and completely represent a state, as
twenty ; and when the true interest of each state is known, if
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
17
the senators perform the part of good legislators, and act im-
partially for the whole collective body of the United States,
it is totally immaterial where they are chosen.*
[22] The house of representatives is the more immediate
voice of the separate states — here the states are represented
in proportion to their number of inhabitants — here the separ-
ate interests will operate with their full force, and the violence
of parties and the jealousies produced by interfering interests,
can be restrained and quieted only by a body of men, less
local and dependent.
It may be objected that no separate interests should exist
in a state ; and a division of the legislature has a tendency to
create them. But this objection is founded on mere jealousy,
or a very imperfect comparison of the Roman and British gov-
ernments, with the proposed federal constitution.
* It is a capital defect of most of the state-constitutions, that the senators,
like the representatives, are chosen in particular districts, They are thus in-
spired with local views, and however wrong it may be to entertain them, yet
such is the constitution of human nature, that men are almost involuntarily
attached to the interest of the district which has reposed confidence in their
abilities and integrity. Some partiality therefore for constituents is always
expectable. To destroy it as much as possible, a political constitution should
remove the grounds of local attachment. Connecticut and Maryland have
wisely destroyed this attachment in their senates, by ordaining that the members
shall be chosen in the state at large. The senators hold their seats by the suf-
frages of the state, not of a district; hence they have no particular number of
men to fear or to oblige. — They represent the state; hence that union and firm-
ness which the senates of those states have manifested on the most trying occa-
sions, and by which they have prevented the most rash and iniquitous measures.
It may be objected, that when the election of senators is vested in the peo-
ple, they must choose men in their own neighborhood, or else those with whom
they are unacquainted. With respect to representatives, this objection does
not lie ; for they are chosen in small districts ; and as to senators, there is, in
every state, a small number of men, whose reputation for abilities, integrity
and good conduct will lead the people to a very just choice. Old experienced
statesmen should compose the senate ; and people are generally, in this free
country, acquainted with their characters. Were it possible, as it is in small
states, it would be an improvement in the doctrine of representation, to give
every freeman the right of voting for every member of the legislature, and the
privilege of choosing the men in any part of the state. This would totally
exclude bribery and undue influence ; for no man can bribe a state ; and it
would almost annihilate partial views in legislation. But in large states it may
be impracticable.
i8
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
The house of peers in England is a body originally and
totally independent on [*] the people — the senate in Rome
was mostly composed of patrician or noble families, and after
the first election of a senator, he was no longer dependent on
the people — he held his seat for life. But the senate of the
United States can have no separate interests from the body of
the people; for they live among them — they are chosen by
them — they must be dismissed from their place once in six
years and may at any time be impeached for mal-practices —
— their property is si- [23] tuated among the people, and with
their persons, subject to the same laws. No title can be
granted, but the temporary titles of office, bestowed by the
voluntary election of the people ; and no pre-eminence can be
acquired but by the same means.
The separation of the legislature divides the power — checks
— restrains — amends the proceedings — at the same time, it
creates no division of interest, that can tempt either branch to
encroach upon the other, or upon the people. In turbulent
times, such restraint is our greatest safety — in calm times, and
in measures obviously calculated for the general good, both
branches must always be unanimous.
A man must be thirty years of age before he can be admit-
ted into the senate — which was likewise a requisite in the
Roman government. What property was requisite for a sen-
ator in the early ages of Rome, I cannot inform myself ; but
Augustus fixed it at six hundred sestertia — between six and
seven thousand pounds sterling. In the federal constitution,
money is not made a requisite — the places of senators are
wisely left open to all persons of suitable age and merit, and
who have been citizens of the United States for nine years ; a
term in which foreigners may acquire the feelings and acquaint
themselves with the interests, of the native Americans.
The house of representatives is formed on very equitable
principles ; and is calculated to guard the privileges of the
people. The English [24] house of commons is chosen by a
small part of the people of England, and continues for seven
years. The Romans never discovered the secret of represen-
tation— the whole body of citizens assembled for the purposes
[* of]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
19
of legislation — a circumstance that exposed their government
to frequent convulsions, and to capricious measures. The
federal house of representatives is chosen by the people qual-
ified to vote for state representatives,* and continues two
years.
[25] Some may object to their continuance in power two
years. But I cannot see any danger arising from this quarter.
On the contrary, it creates less trouble for the representatives,
who by such choice are taken from their professions and
obliged to attend Congress, some of them at the distance of
at least seven hundred miles. While men are chosen by the
people, and responsible to them, there is but little danger
from ambition or corruption.
If it should be said that Congress may in time become tri-
ennial, and even septennial, like the English parliaments, I
answer, this is not in their power. The English parliament
had power to prolong the period of their existence — but Con-
gress will be restrained by the different legislatures, without
* It is said by some, that no property should be required as a qualification
for an elector. I shall not enter into a discussion of the subject; but remark
that in most free governments, some property has been thought requisite, to
prevent corruption and secure government from the influence of an unprinci.
pled multitude.
In ancient Rome none but the free citizens had the right of a suffrage in the
comitia or legislative assemblies. But in Sylla's time the Italian cities demanded
the rights of the Roman citizens; alledging that they furnished two-thirds of the
armies, in all their wars, and yet were despised as foreigners. Veil Paterc.
lib. 2. cap. 15. This produced the Marsic or social war, which lasted two
years, and caried off 300,000 men. Ibm. It was conducted and concluded by
Pompey, father of Pompey the Great, with his lieutenants Sylla and Marius.
But most of the cities eventually obtained the freedom of Rome; and were of
course entitled to the rights of suffrage in the comitia. "Paulatim deinde recip-
" iendo in civitatem, qui arma aut non ceperant aut deposuerant maturius,
"vires refectae sunt." Veil. Paterc. 2. 16.
But Rome had cause to deplore this event, for however reasonable it might
appear to admit the allies to a participation of the rights of citizens, yet the
concession destroyed all freedom of election. It enabled an ambitious dema-
gogue to engage and bring into the assemblies, whole towns of people, slaves
and foreigners; — and everything was decided by faction and violence. This
Montesquieu numbers among the causes of the decline of the Roman greatness.
De la grandeur des Romains, c. 9.
Representation would have, in some measure, prevented the consequences;
20
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
whose constitutional concurrence, no alteration can be made
in the proposed system.
The fourth section, article I, of the new constitution
declares that "The times, places, and manner of holding elec-
" tions for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in
" each state by the legislature thereof ; but the Congress may
" at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to
" the places of chusing senators." Here let us pause What
did the convention mean by giving Congress power to make
regulations, prescribed by the legislatures? Is this expression
accurate or intelligible? But the word alter is very intelligi-
ble, and the clause puts the election of representatives wholly,
and [26] the senators almost wholly, in the power of Congress.
The views of the convention I believe to be perfectly
upright — They might mean to place the election of representa-
tives and senators beyond the reach of faction — They doubtless
had good reasons, in their minds, for the clause — But I see no
occasion for any power in Congress to interfere with the
choice of their own body — They will have power to suppress
insurrections, as they ought to have ; but the clause in Italics
gives needless and dangerous powers — I hope the states will
reject it with decency, and adopt the whole system, without
altering another syllable. [*]
The method of passing laws in Congress is much preferable
to that of ancient Rome or modern Britain. Not to mention
other defects in Rome, it lay in the power of a single tribune
but the admission of every man to a suffrage will ever open the door to corrup-
tion. In such a state as Connecticut, where there is no conflux of foreigners, no
introduction of seamen, servants, &c, and scarcely an hundred persons in the
state who are not natives, and very few whose education and connexions do
not attach them to the government ; at the same time few men have property
to furnish the means of corruption, very little danger could spring from admit-
ting every man of age and discretion to the privilege of voting for rulers. But
in the large towns of America there is more danger. A master of a vessel may
put votes in the hands of his crew, for the purpose of carrying an election for a
party. Such things have actually taken place in America. Besides, the mid-
dle states are receiving emigrations of poor people, who are not at once judges
of the characters of men, and who cannot be safely trusted with the choice of
legislators.
[* These two paragraphs struck out in author's copy. — p. l. f.]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
21
to obstruct the passing of a law. As the tribunes were popu-
lar magistrates, the right was often exercised in favor of lib-
erty ; but it was also abused, and the best regulations were
prevented, to gratify the spleen, the ambition, or the resent-
ment of an individual.
The king of Great-Britain has the same power, but seldom
exercises it. It is however a dangerous power — it is absurd
and hazardous to lodge in one man the right of controlling the
will of a state.
Every bill that passes a majority of both houses of Con-
gress, must be sent to the president for [27] his approbation ;
but it must be returned in ten days, whether approved by him
or not ; and the concurrence of two thirds of both houses passes
the bill into a law, notwithstanding any objections of the presi-
dent. The constitution therefore gives the supreme executive
a check but no negative, upon the sense of Congress.
The powers lodged in Congress are extensive ; but it is
presumed that they are not too extensive. The first object of
the constitution is to unite the states into one compact society,
for the purpose of government. If such union must exist, or
the states be exposed to foreign invasions, internal discord,
reciprocal encroachments upon each others property — to
weakness and infamy, which no person will dispute ; what
powers must be collected and lodged in the supreme head or
legislature of these states. The answer is easy : This legisla-
ture must have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters in which
the states have a mutual interest. There are some regulations
in which all the states are equally concerned — there are others,
which in their operation, are limited to one state. The first
belongs to Congress — the last to the respective legislatures. No
one state has a right to supreme control, in any affair in which
the other states have an interest, nor should Congress interfere
in any affair which respects one state only. This is the gen-
eral line of division, which the convention have endeavored to
draw, between the powers of Congress and the rights of the
individual states. The only question therefore is, whether
the new constitution delegates to Congress any powers which
[28] do not respect the general interest and welfare of the
22
RXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
United States. If these powers intrench upon the present
sovereignty of any state, without having for an object the col-
lective interest of the whole, the powers are too extensive. But
if they do not extend to all concerns, in which the states have
a mutual interest, they are too limited. If in any instance5
the powers necessary for protecting the general interest, inter-
fere with the constitutional rights of an individual state, such
state has assumed powers that are inconsistent with the safety
of the United States, and which ought instantly to be resigned.
Considering the states as individuals, on equal terms, entering
into a social compact, no state has a right to any power which
may prejudice its neighbors. If therefore the federal constitu-
tion has collected into the federal legislature no more power
than is necessary for the common defence and interest, it should
be recognized by the states, however particular clauses may
supersede the exercise of certain powers by the individual
states.
This question is of vast magnitude. The states have very
high ideas of their separate sovereignty; altho' it is certain,
that while each exists in its full latitude, we can have no Fed-
eral sovereignty. However flattered each state may be by its
independent sovereignty, we can have no union, no respecta-
bility, no national character, and what is more, no national
justice, till the states resign to one supreme head the exclusive
power of legislating, judging and executing, in all matters of a
general nature. Every thing of [29] a private or provincial
nature, must still rest on the ground of the respective state-
constitutions.
After examining the limits of the proposed congressional
powers, I confess I do not think them too extensive — I firmly
believe that the life, liberty and property of every man, and
the peace and independence of each state, will be more fully
secured under such a constitution of federal government, than
they will under a constitution with more limited powers; and
infinitely more safe than under our boasted distinct sovereign-
ties. It appears to me that Congress will have no more power
than will be necessary for our union and general welfare ; and
such power they must have or we are in a wretched state. On
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
23
the adoption of this constitution, I should value real estate
twenty per cent, higher than I do at this moment.
I will not examine into the extent of the powers proposed
to be lodged in the supreme federal head ; the subject would
be extensive and require more time than I could bestow upon
it. But I will take up some objections, that have been made
to particular points of the new constitution.
Most of the objections I have yet heard to the constitution,
consist in mere insinuations unsupported by reasoning or fact.
They are thrown out to instil groundless jealousies into the
minds of the people, and probably with a view to prevent all
government ; for there are, in every society, some turbulent
geniuses whose importance [30] depends solely on faction.
To seek the insidious and detestable nature of these insinua-
tions, it is necessary to mention, and to remark on a few par-
ticulars.
1. The first objection against the constitution is, that the
legislature will be more expensive than our present confedera-
tion. This is so far from being true, that the money we actually
lose by our present weakness, disunion and want of government
would support the civil government of every state in the con-
federacy. Our public poverty does not proceed from the
expensiveness of Congress, nor of the civil list ; but from want
of power to command our own advantages. We pay more
money to foreign nations, in the course of business, and merely
for want of government, than would, under an efficient govern-
ment, pay the annual interest of our domestic debt. Every
man in business knows this to be truth ; and the objection can
be designed only to delude the ignorant.
2. Another objection to the constitution, is the division of
the legislature into two branches. Luckily this objection has
no advocates but in Pennsylvania ; and even here their num-
ber is dwindling. The factions that reign in this state, the
internal discord and passions that disturb the government and
the peace of the inhabitants, have detected the errors of the
constitution, and will some time or other produce a reforma-
tion. The division of the legislature has been the subject of
discussion in the beginning of this essay ; and will be deemed,
24
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
by nineteen-twentieths of [31] the Americans, one of the prin-
cipal excellencies of the constitution.
3. A third insinuation, is that the proposed federal gov-
ernment will annihilate the several legislatures. This is ex-
tremely disingenuous. Every person, capable of reading,
must discover, that the convention have labored to draw the
line between the federal and provincial powers — to define the
powers of Congress, and limit them to those general concerns
which must come under federal jurisdiction, and which cannot
be managed in the separate legislatures — that in all internal
regulations, whether of civil or criminal nature, the states
retain their sovereignty, and have it guaranteed to them by
this very constitution. Such a groundless insinuation, or
rather mere surmise, must proceed from dark designs or
extreme ignorance, and deserves the severest reprobation.
4. It is alledged that the liberty of the press is not guar-
anteed by the new constitution. But this objection is wholly
unfounded. The liberty of the press does not come within
the jurisdiction of federal government. It is firmly established
in all the states either by law, or positive declarations in bills
of right ; and not being mentioned in the federal constitution,
is not — and cannot be abridged by Congress. It stands on the
basis of the respective state-constitutions. Should any state
resign to Congress the exclusive jurisdiction of a certain dis-
trict, which should include any town where presses are already
established, it is in the power of the state to reserve [32] the
liberty of the press, or any other fundamental privilege, and
make it an immutable condition of the grant, that such rights
shall never be violated. All objections therefore on this score
are " baseless visions."
5. It is insinuated that the constitution gives Congress the
power of levying internal taxes at pleasure. This insinuation
seems founded on the eighth section of the first article, which
declares, that " Congress shall have power to lay and collect
" taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and pro-
" vide for the common defence and general welfare of the
44 United States."
That Congress should have power to collect duties, imposts
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
25
and excises, in order to render them uniform throughout the
United States will hardly be controverted. The whole objec-
tion is to the right of levying internal taxes.
But it will be conceded that the supreme head of the states
must have power, competent to the purposes of our union, or
it will be, as it now is, a useless body, a mere expense, without
any advantage. To pay our public debt, to support foreign
ministers and our own civil government, money must be
raised ; and if the duties and imposts are not adequate to
these purposes, where shall the money be obtained ? It will
be answered, let Congress apportion the sum to be raised, and
leave the legislatures to collect the money. Well this is all
that is intended by the clause under consideration ; with the
addition of a fe- [33] deral power that shall be sufficient to
oblige a delinquent state to comply with the requisition. [*]
Such power must exist somewhere, or the debts of the United
States can never be paid. For want of such power, our credit
is lost and our national faith is a bye-word.
For want of such power, one state now complies fully with
a requisition, another partially, and a third absolutely refuses
or neglects to grant a shilling. Thus the honest and punctual
are doubly loaded — and the knave triumphs in his negligence.
In short, no honest man will dread a power that shall enforce
an equitable system of taxation. The dis-honest are ever
apprehensive of a power that shall oblige them to do what
honest men are ready to do voluntarily.
Permit me to ask those who object to this power of taxa-
tion, how shall money be raised to discharge our honest debts
which are universally acknowledged to be just? ^Have we
not already experienced the inefficacy of a system without
power? Has it not been proved to demonstration, that a vol-
untary compliance with the demands of the union can never
be expected ? To what expedient shall we have recourse ?
What is the resort of all governments in cases of delinquency?
Do not the states vest in the legislature, or even in the gov-
ernor and council, a power to enforce laws, even with the mil-
itia of the states ? And how rarely does there exist the neces-
sity of exerting such a power? Why should such a power be
[* Last two sentences struck out in author's copy. — p. l. f.]
26
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
more dangerous in Congress than in a legislature ? Why
should [34] more confidence be reposed in a member of one
legislature than of another? Why should we choose the best
men in the state to represent us in Congress, and the moment
they are elected arm ourselves against them as against tyrants
and robbers ? Do we not, in this conduct, act the part of a
man, who, as soon as he has married a woman of unsuspected
chastity, locks her up in a dungeon? Is there any spell or
charm, that instantly changes a delegate to Congress from an
honest man into a knave — a tyrant? I confess freely that I
am willing to trust Congress with any powers that I should
dare lodge in a state-legislature. I believe life, liberty, and
property is as safe in the hands of a federal legislature, organ-
ized in the manner proposed by the convention, as in the
hands of any legislature, that has ever been or ever will be
chosen in any particular state.
But the idea that Congress can levy taxes at pleasure is
false, and the suggestion wholly unsupported. The preamble
to the constitution is declaratory of the purposes of our union.'
and the assumption of any powers not necessary to establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessi?igs
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, will be unconstitutional,
and endanger the existence of Congress. Besides, in the very
clause which gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the
purposes to which the money shall be appropriated are speci-
fied, viz. to pay the debts and provide for the common de- [35]
fence and general welfare of the United States* For these
purposes money must be collected, and the power of collection
must be lodged, sooner or later, in a federal head ; or the com-
mon defence and general welfare must be neglected.
The states in their separate capacity, cannot provide for
* The clause may at first appear ambiguous. It may be uncertain whether
we should read and understand it thus — "The Congress shall have power to
"lay and collect taxes, 'duties, imposts and excises in order to pay the debts" &c.
or whether the meaning is — "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
" taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and shall have power to pay the debts" &c.
On considering the construction of the clause, and comparing it with the pre-
amble, the last sense seems to be improbable and absurd. But it is not very
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
27
the common defence ; nay in case of a civil war, a state cannot
secure its own existence. The only question therefore is,
whether it is necessary to unite, and provide for our common
defence and general welfare. For this question being once
decided in the affirmative, leaves no room to controvert the
propriety of constituting a power over the whole United
States, adequate to these general purposes.
The states, by granting such power, do not throw it out
of their own hands — they only throw, each its proportion, into
a common stock — they merely combine the powers of the sev-
eral states into one point, where they must be collected, before
they can be exerted. But the powers are still in their own
hands ; and cannot be alienated, till they create a body inde-
pendent of them- [36] selves, with a force at their command,
superior to the whole yeomanry of the country.
6. It is said there is no provision made in the new consti-
tution against a standing army in time of peace. Why do not
people object that no provision is made against the introduc-
tion of a body of Turkish Janizaries; or against making the
Alcoran the rule of faith and practice, instead of the Bible ?
The answer to such objections is simply this — no stick provision
is necessary. The people in this country cannot forget their
apprehensions from a British standing army, quartered in
America ; and they turn their fears and jealousies against them-
selves. Why do not the people of most of the states apprehend
danger from standing armies from their own legislatures?
Pennsylvania and North Carolina, I believe, are the only states
that have provided against this danger at all events. Other
states have declared that " no standing armies shall be kept up
without the consent of the legislature." But this leaves the
power entirely in the hands of the legislature. Many of the
states however have made no provision against this evil. What
material; for no powers are vested in Congress but what are included under
the general expressions, of providing for the common defence and general welfare
of the United States. Any powers not promotive of these purposes, will be
unconstitutional; — consequently any appropriations of money to any other pur-
pose will expose the Congress to the resentment of the states, and the members
to impeachment and loss of their seats.
28
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
hazards these states suffer ! Why does not a man pass a law
in his family, that no armed soldier shall be quartered in his
house by his consent ? The reason is very plain : no man will
suffer his liberty to be abridged, or endangered — his disposi-
tion and his power are uniformly opposed to any infringement
of his rights. In the same manner, the principles and habits,
as well as the power of the Americans are directly opposed to
standing armies ; and there is as little [37] necessity to guard
against them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit the
establishment of the Mahometan religion. But the constitu-
tion provides for our safety ; and while it gives Congress
power to raise armies, it declares that no appropriation of
money to their support shall be for a longer term than two
years.
Congress likewise are to have power to provide for organ-
izing, arming and disciplining the militia, but have no other
command of them, except when in actual service. Nor are
they at liberty to call out the militia at pleasure — but only, to
execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions. For these purposes, government must always
be armed with a military force, if the occasion should require
it ; otherwise laws are nugatory, and life and property inse-
cure.
7. Some persons have ventured to publish an intimation,
that by the proposed constitution, the trial by jury is abolished
in all civil cases. Others very modestly insinuate, that it is in
some cases only. The fact is, that trial by jury is not affected
in any case, by the constitution ; except in cases of impeach-
ment, which are to be tried by the senate. None but persons
in office in or under Congress can be impeached ; and even
after a judgment upon an impeachment, the offender is liable
to a prosecution, before a common jury, in a regular course of
law. The insinuation therefore that trials by jury are to be
abolished, is groundless, and beyond conception, wicked. It
must be wicked, because the circu- [38] lation of a barefaced
falsehood, respecting a privilege, dear to freemen, can proceed
only from a depraved heart and the worst intentions.
8. It is also intimated as a probable event, that the federal
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
29
courts will absorb the judiciaries of the federal states. This is
a mere suspicion, without the least foundation. The jurisdic-
tion of the federal states is very accurately defined and easily
understood. It extends to the cases mentioned in the consti-
tution, and to the execution of the laws of Congress, respect-
ing commerce, revenue, and other general concerns.
With respect to other civil and criminal actions, the powers
and jurisdiction of the several judiciaries of each state, remain
unimpaired. Nor is there anything novel in allowing appeals
to the supreme court. Actions are mostly to be tried in the
state where the crimes are committed — But appeals are al-
lowed under our present confederation, and no person com-
plains ; nay, were there no appeal, every man would have
reason to complain, especially when a final judgement, in an
inferior court, should affect property to a large amount. But
why is an objection raised against an appellate jurisdiction in
the supreme court, respecting/*?*;/ as well as law? Is it less
safe to have the opinions of two juries than of one ? I sus-
pect many people will think this is no defect in the constitu-
tion. But perhaps it will destroy a material requisite of a
good jury, viz. their vicinity to the cause of action. I have no
doubt, that when causes were tried, in periods prior to the
Christian aera, before [39] twelve men, seated upon twelve
stones, arranged in a circular form, under a huge oak, there
was great propriety in submitting causes to men in the vicinity.
The difficulty of collecting evidence, in those rude times, ren-
dered it necessary that juries should judge mostly from their
own knowledge of facts or from information obtained out of
court. But in these polished ages, when juries depend almost
wholly on the testimony of witnesses ; and when a complica-
tion of interests, introduced by commerce and other causes,
renders it almost impossible to collect men, in the vicinity
of the parties, who are wholly disinterested, it is no disadvan-
tage to have a cause tried by a jury of strangers. Indeed the
latter is generally the most eligible.
But the truth is, the creation of all inferior courts is in the
power of Congress ; and the constitution provides that Con-
gress may make such exceptions from the right of appeals as
30
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
they shall judge proper. When these courts are erected, their
jurisdictions will be ascertained, and in small actions, Congress
will doubtless direct that a sentence in a subordinate court
shall, to a certain amount, be definite and final. All objec-
tions therefore to the judicial powers of the federal courts
appear to me as trifling as any of the preceding.
9. But, say the enemies of slavery, negroes may be imported
for twenty-one years. This exception is addressed to the
quakers ; and a very pitiful exception it is.
[40] The truth is, Congress cannot prohibit the importation
of slaves during that period ; but the laws against the import-
ation into particular states, stand unrepealed. An immediate
abolition of slavery would bring ruin upon the whites, and
misery upon the blacks, in the southern states. The constitu-
tion has therefore wisely left each state to pursue its own
measures, with respect to this article of legislation, during the
period of twenty-one years.
Such are the principal objections that have yet been made
by the enemies of the new constitution. They are mostly
frivolous, or founded on false constructions, and a misrepre-
sentation of the true state of facts. They are evidently
designed to raise groundless jealousies in the minds of well
meaning people, who have little leisure and opportunity to
examine into the principles of government. But a little time
and reflection will enable most people to detect such mischiev-
ous intentions ; and the spirit and firmness which have distin-
guished the conduct of the Americans, during the conflict for
independence, will eventually triumph over the enemies of
union, and bury them in disgrace or oblivion.
But I cannot quit this subject without attempting to correct
some of the erroneous opinions respecting/Vm/^;/* and tyranny,
and the principles by which they are supported. Many people
seem to entertain an idea, that liberty consists in a power to
act without any control. This is more liberty than even the
savages enjoy. But in civil society, political liberty consists in
[41] acting conformably to a sense of a majority of the society. In
a free government every man binds himself to obey the public
voice, or the opinions of a majority; and the whole society
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
31
engages to protect each individual. In such a government a
man is free and safe. But reverse the case ; suppose every
man to act without control or fear of punishment — every man
would be free, but no man would be sure of his freedom one
moment. Each would have the power of taking his neighbor's
life, liberty, or property ; and no man would command more
than his own strength to repel the invasion. The case is the
same with states. If the states should not unite into one
compact society, every state may trespass upon its neighbor,
and the injured state has no means of redress but its own
military force.
The present situation of our American states is very little
better than a state of nature — Our boasted state sovereignties
are so far from securing our liberty and property, that they,
every moment, expose us to the loss of both. That state
which commands the heaviest purse and longest sword, may at
any moment, lay its weaker neighbor under tribute ; and there
is no superior power now existing, that can regularly oppose
the invasion or redress the injury. From such liberty, O
*Lord, deliver us !
But what is tyranny? Or how can a free people be de-
prived of their liberties ? Tyranny is the exercise of some
power over a man, which is not warranted by law, or necessary
for the public safety. A people can never be deprived of
[42] their liberties, while they retain in their own hands, a
power sufficient to any other power in the state. This posi-
tion leads me directly to enquire, in what consists the power
of a nation or of an order of men ?
In some nations, legislators have derived much of their
power from the influence of religion, or from that implicit
belief which an ignorant and superstitious people entertain of
the gods, and their interposition in every transaction of life.
The Roman senate sometimes availed themselves of this
engine to carry their decrees and maintain their authority.
This was particularly the case, under the aristocracy which
succeeded the abolition of the monarchy. The augurs and
[* " O " changed to " good " in author's copy p. l. f.]
32
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
priests were taken wholly from patrician families.* They
constituted a distinct order of men — had power to negative
any law of the people, by declaring that it was passed during
the taking of the auspices.f [T] This influence derived from
the authority of opinion, was less perceptible, but as tyranni-
cal as a military force. The same influence constitutes, at
this day, a principal support of federal governments on the
Eastern continent, and perhaps in South America. But in
North America, by a singular concurrence of circumstances,
the possibility of establishing this influence, as a pillar of gov-
ernment, is totally precluded.
[43] Another source of power in government is a military
force. But this, to be efficient, must be superior to any force
that exists among the people, or which they can command :
for otherwise this force would be annihilated, on the first
exercise of acts of oppression. Before a standing army can
rule, the people must be disarmed ; as they are in almost
every kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America
cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword ; because the whole
body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior
to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence,
raised in the United States. A military force, at the com-
mand of Congress, can execute no laws, but such as the people
perceive to be just and constitutional ; for they will possess
the pozver, and jealousy will instantly inspire the inclination,
to resist the execution of a law which appears to them unjust
and oppressive. In spite of all the nominal powers, vested in
Congress by the constitution, were the system once adopted
in its fullest latitude, still the actual exercise of them would
be frequently interrupted by popular jealousy. I am bold to
say, that ten just and constitutional measures would be re-
sisted, where one unjust or oppressive law would be enforced.
* " Quod nemo plebeius auspicia haberet, ideoque decemviros connubium
diremisse, ne incerta prole auspicia turbarentur." Tit. Liv. lib. 4. cap. 6.
f Auguriis certe sacerdotisque augurum tantus honos accessit, ut nihil belli
domique postea, nisi auspicato, gereretur : concilia populi, exercitus vocati,
summa rerum, ubi aves non admisissent, dirimerentur. Liv. lib. 1. cap. 37.
[T[ " The " and " of " struck out — " without " substituted in author's copy —
P. L. F.]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
33
The powers vested in Congress are little more than nominal ;
nay real power cannot be vested in them, nor in any body, but
in the people. The source of power is in the people of this
country, and cannot for ages, and probably never will, be re-
moved, [f].
In what then does real power consist ? The answer is
short and plain — in property. Could [44] we want any proofs
of this, which are not exhibited in this country, the uniform
testimony of history will furnish us with multitudes. But I
will go no farther for proof, than the two governments already
mentioned, the Roman and the British.
Rome exhibited a demonstrative proof of the inseparable
connexion between property and dominion. The first form
of its government was an elective monarchy — its second, an
aristocracy; but these forms could not be permanent, because
they were not supported by property. The kings at first and
afterwards the patricians had nominally most of the power.;
but the people, possessing most of the lands, never ceased to
assert their privileges, till they established a commonwealth.
And the kings and senate could not have held the reigns of
government in their hands so long as they did, had they not
artfully contrived to manage the established religion, and play
off the superstitious credulity of the people against their own
power. "Thus this weak constitution of government," says
the ingenious Mr. Moyle, speaking of the aristocracy of Rome,
" not founded on the true center of dominion, land, nor on any
" standing foundation of authority, nor rivetted in the esteem
" and affections of the people ; and being attacked by strong
4i passion, general interest and the joint forces of the people,
" mouldered away of course, and pined of a lingering con-
" sumption, till it was totally swallowed up by the prevailing
" faction, and the nobility were moulded into the mass of the
"people."* The people, notwithstanding [45] the nominal
authority of the patricians, proceeded regularly in enlarging
their own powers. They first extorted from the senate, the
right of electing tribunes, with a negative upon the proceed-
[f Last two sentences struck out in author's copy. — P. L. F.]
-* Essay on the Roman government.
34
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
ings of the senate.** They obtained the right of proposing
and debating laws ; which before had been vested in the senate ;
and finally advanced to the power of enacting laws, without
the authority of the senate. + They regained the rights of
election in their comitia, of which they had been deprived by
Servius Tullius."]: They procured a permanent body of laws,
collected from the Grecian institutions. They destroyed the
influence of augurs, or diviners, by establishing the tributa
comitia, in which they were not allowed to consult the gods.
They increased their power by large accessions of conquered
lands. They procured a repeal of the law which prohibited
marriages between the patricians and plebians.§ The Licinian
law limited all possessions to five hundred acres of land ;
which, had it been fully executed, would have secured the
commonwealth. |
The Romans proceeded thus step by step to triumph over
the aristocracy, and to crown their privileges, they procured
the right of being elected to the highest offices of the state.
By acquiring the property of the plebians, the nobility, several
times, held most of the power of the state ; but the people, by
reducing the interest of money, abolishing debts, or by forcing
[46] other advantages from the patricians, generally held the
power of governing in their own hands.
In America, we begin our empire with more popular priv-
ileges than the Romans ever enjoyed. We have not to
struggle against a monarch or an aristocracy — power is lodged
in the mass of the people.
On reviewing the English history, we observe a progress
similar to that in Rome — an incessant struggle for liberty from
the date of Magna Charta, in John's reign, to the revolution.
The struggle has been successful, by abridging the enormous
power of the nobility. But we observe that the power of the
people has increased in an exact proportion to their acquisi-
tions of property. Wherever the right of primogeniture is
established, property must accumulate and remain in families.
Thus the landed property in England will never be sufficiently
* Livy, 2. 33. f Livy, 3. 54. % Livy, 3. 33. §Livy, 4. 6, | Livy,
6. 35. 42. " Ne quis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret."
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
35
distributed, to give the powers of government wholly into the
hands of the people. But to assist the struggle for liberty,
commerce has interposed, and in conjunction with manufac-
turers, thrown a vast weight of property into the democratic
scale. Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth, that
property is the basis of power ; and this, being established as a
cardinal point, directs us to the means of preserving our
freedom. Make laws, irrevocable laws in every state, destroy-
ing and barring entailments ; leave real estates to revolve from
hand to hand, as time and accident may direct; and no family
influence can be acquired and established for a series of
genera- [47] tions — no man can obtain dominion over a large
territory — the laborious and saving, who are generally the best
citizens, wTill possess each his share of property and power, and
thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it
is, in the body of the people.
A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed prop-
erty is the whole basis of national freedom : The system of
the great Montesquieu will ever be erroneous, till the words
property or lands in fee simple are substituted for virtue,
throughout his Spirit of Laws.
Virtue, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never
will be, till mens' natures are changed, a fixed, permanent
principle and support of government. But in an agricultural
country, a general possession of land in fee simple, may be
rendered perpetual, and the inequalities introduced by com-
merce, are too fluctuating to endanger government. An
equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, constantly
operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is the
very soul of a republic — While this continues, the people will
inevitably possess both pozver and freedom; when this is lost,
power departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth will
inevitably assume some other form.
The liberty of the press, trial by jury, the Habeas Corpus
writ, even Magna Charta itself, although justly deemed the
palladia of freedom, are all inferior considerations, when" com-
pared with a general distribution of real property' among
36
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
[48] every class of people.* The power of entailing estates is
more dangerous to liberty and republican government, than
all the constitutions that can be written on paper, or even
than a standing army. Let the people have property, and
they will have power — a power that will for ever be exerted
to prevent a restriction of the press, and abolition of trial by
jury, or the abridgement of any other privilege. The liber-
ties of America, therefore, and her forms of government,
stand on the broadest basis. Removed from the fears of a
foreign invasion and conquest, they are [49] not exposed to
the convulsions that shake other governments ; and the prin-
ciples of freedom are so general and energetic, as to exclude
the possibility of a change in our republican constitutions.
But while property is considered as the basis of the free-
dom of the American yeomanry, there are other auxiliary sup-
ports ; among which is the information of the people. In no-
country, is education so general — in no country, have the body
of the people such a knowledge of the rights of men and the
* Montesquieu supposed virtue to be the principle of a republic. He de-
rived his notions of this form of government, from the astonishing firmness,
courage and patriotism which distinguished the republics of Greece and Rome.
But this virtue consisted in pride, contempt of strangers and a martial enthusi-
asm which sometimes displayed itself in defence of their country. These
principles are never permanent — they decay with refinement, intercourse with
other nations and increase of wealth. No wonder then that these republics
declined, for they were not founded on fixed principles ; and hence authors
imagine that republics cannot be durable. None of the celebrated writers
on government seems to have laid sufficient stress on a general possession of
real property in fee-simple. Even the authors of the Political Sketches, in the
Museum for the month of September, seems to have passed it over in silence ;
although he combats Montesquieu's system, and to prove it false, enumerates
some of the principles which distinguish our governments from others, and
which he supposes constitutes the support of republics.
The English writers on law and government consider Magna Charta, trial
by juries, the Habeas Corpus act, and the liberty of the press, as the bulwarks
of freedom. All this is well. But in no government of consequence in Europe,
is freedom established on its true and immoveable foundation. The property
is too much accumulated, and the accumulations too well guarded, to admit
the true principle of republics. But few centuries have elapsed, since the body
of the people were vassals. To such men, the smallest extension of popular
privileges, was deemed an invaluable blessing. Hence the encomiums upon
trial by juries, and the articles just mentioned. But these people have never.
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
37
principles of government. This knowledge, joined with a
keen sense of liberty and a watchful jealousy, will guard our
constitutions, and awaken the people to an instantaneous
resistance of encroachments.
But a principal bulwark of freedom is the right of election*
An equal distribution of property is the foundation of a repub-
lic ; but popular elections form the great barrier, which defends
it from assault, and guards it from the slow and imperceptible
approaches of corruption. Americans ! never resign that
right. It is not very material whether your representatives
are elected for one year or two — but the right is the Magna
Charta of your governments. For this reason, expunge that
clause of the new constitution before mentioned, which gives
Congress an influence in the election of their own body. The
time i place and mariner of chusing senators or representatives
are of little or no consequence to Congress. The number o£
members and time of meeting in Congress are fixed ; but the
choice should rest with the several states. [50] I repeat it —
reject the clause with decency, but with unanimity and firm-
ness. [*]
Excepting that clause the constitution is good [f] — it guar-
antees the fundamental principles of our several constitutions
— it guards our rights — and while it vests extensive powers in
Congress, it vests no more than are necessary for our union.
Without powers lodged somewhere in a single body, fully
competent to lay and collect equal taxes and duties — to adjust
been able to mount to the source of liberty, estates in fee, or at least but par-
tially ; they are yet obliged to drink at the streams. Hence the English jealousy
of certain rights, which are guaranteed by acts of parliament. But in America,
and here alone, we have gone at once to the fountain- of liberty, and raised the
people to their true dignity. Let the lands be possessed by the people in fee-
simple, let the fountain be kept pure, and the streams will be pure of course.
Our jealousy of trial by jury, the liberty of the press, &c, is totally groundless.
Such rights are inseparably connected with the power and dignity of the people,
which rest on their property, They cannot be abridged. All other [free]
nations have wrested property and freedom from barons and tyrants ; we begin .
our empire with full possession of property and all its attending rights.
[*Last three sentences struck out in author's copy. — p. L. F.]
[f Revise to "The constitution is generally good. — p, L. F.J
38
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
controversies between different states — to silence contending
interests — to suppress insurrections — to regulate commerce —
to treat with foreign nations, our confederation is a cobweb —
liable to be blown asunder by every blast of faction that is
raised in the remotest corner of the United States.
Every motive that can possibly influence men ever to unite
under civil government, now urges the unanimous adoption of
the new constitution. But in America we are urged to it by a
singular necessity. By the local situation of the several states
a few command all the advantages of commerce. Those states
which have no advantages, made equal exertions for indepen-
dence, loaded themselves with immense debts, and now are
utterly \W unable to discharge them ; while their richer neigh-
bors are taxing them for their own benefit, merely because they
can. I can prove to a demonstration that Connecticut, which
has the heaviest internal or state debt, in proportion to its
number of inhabitants, of any in the union, cannot discharge
its debt, on any principles of taxation ever yet practised. Yet
[51] the state pays in duties, at least 100,000 dollars annually,
on goods consumed by its own people, but imported by New
York. This sum, could it be saved to the state by an equal
system of revenue, would enable that state to gradually sink
its debt.* ft]
New Jersey and some other states are in the same situa-
tion, except that their debts are not so large, in proportion to
their wealth and population.
The boundaries of the several states were not drawn with
a view to independence ; and while this country was subject to
Great Britain, they produced no commercial or political incon-
veniences. But the revolution has placed things on a differ-
ent footing. The advantages of some states, and the disad-
vantages of others are so great — and so materially affect the
business and interest of each, that nothing but an equalizing
[^[ "utterly " struck out. — p. l f.]
*The state debt of Connecticut is about 3,500,000 dollars, its proportion
of the federal debt about the same sum. The annual interest of the whole
420,000 dollars.
[f Last three sentences, the following paragraph and foot note struck out
in author's copy. — P. L. F.]
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
39
system of revenue, that shall reduce the advantages to some
equitable proportion, can prevent a civil .war and save the
national debt. Such a system of revenue is the sine qua non
of public justice and tranquillity.
It is absurd for a man to oppose the adoption of the con-
stitution, because he thinks some part of it defective or excep-
tionable. Let every man be at liberty to expunge what he
judges to be exceptionable, and not a syllable of the constitu-
tion [52] will survive the scrutiny. A painter, after executing
a masterly piece, requested every spectator to draw a pencil
mark over the part that did not please him ; but to his sur-
prise, he soon found the whole piece defaced. Let every man
examine the most perfect building by his own taste, and like
some microscopic critics, condemn the whole for small devia-
tions from the rules of architecture, and not a part of the best
constructed fabric would escape. But let any man take a com-
prehensive view of the whole, and he will be pleased with the
general beauty and proportions, and admire the structure.
The same remarks apply to the new constitution. I have
no doubt that every member of the late convention has
exceptions to some part of the system proposed. Their
constituents have the same, and if every objection must be
removed, before we have a national government, the Lord
have mercy on us.
Perfection is not the lot of humanity. Instead of censur-
ing the small faults of the constitution, I am astonished that
so many clashing interests have been reconciled — and so many
sacrifices made to the general interest ! The mutual conces-
sions made by the gentlemen of the convention, reflect the
highest honor on their candor and liberality ; at the same time,
they prove that their minds were deeply impressed with a con-
viction, that such mutual sacrifices are essential to our union.
They must be made sooner or later by every state ; or jealous-
ies, local interests and prejudices will unsheath the sword, and
some Caesar or Cromwell will avail himself [53] of our divisions,
and wade to a throne through streams of blood.
It is not our duty as freemen, to receive the opinions of
any men however great and respectable, without an examina-
40
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
tion. But when we reflect that [*] some of the greatest men
in America, with the venerable Franklin and the illustrious
WASHINGTON at their head ; some of them the fathers and
saviors of their country, men who have labored at the helm
during a long and violent tempest, and guided us to the haven
of peace — and all of them distinguished for their abilities
their acquaintance with ancient and modern governments, as
well as with the temper, the passions, the interests and the
wishes of the Americans ; — when we reflect on these circum-
stances, it is impossible to resist impressions of respect, and
we are almost impelled to suspect our own judgements, when
we call in question any part of the system, which they have
recommended for adoption. Not having the same means of
information, we are more liable to mistake the nature and ten-
dency of particular articles of the constitution, or the reasons
on which they were admitted. Great confidence therefore
should be reposed in the abilities, the zeal and integrity of
that respectable body. But after all, if the constitution
should, in its future operation, be found defective or inconve-
nient, two-thirds of both houses of Congress or the application
of two-thirds of the legislatures, may open the door for
amendments. Such improvements may then be made, as
experience shall dictate.
[54] Let us then consider the New Feder-al Constitution, as
it really is, an improvement on the best constitutions that the
world ever saw. In the house of representatives, the people
of America have an equal voice and suffrage. The choice of
men is placed in the freemen or electors at large ; and the
frequency of elections, and the responsibility of the members,
will render them sufficiently dependent on their constituents.
The senate will be composed of older men ; and while their
regular dismission from office, once in six years, will preserve
their dependence on their constituents, the duration of their
existence will give firmness to their decisions, and temper the
factions which must necessarily prevail in the other branch.
The president of the United States is elective, and what is
a capital improvement on the best governments, the mode
[*"The convention was composed of," added after " that," by author. —
P. L. F']
EXAMINATION BY NOAH WEBSTER.
41
of chusing him excludes the danger of faction and corrup-
tion. [*] As the supreme executive, he is invested with power
to enforce the laws of the union and give energy to the fed-
eral government.
The constitution defines the powers of Congress ; and every
power not expressly delegated to that body, remains in the
several state-legislatures. The sovereignty and the republican
form of government of each state is guaranteed by the consti-
tution ; and the bounds of jurisdiction between the federal
and respective state governments, are marked with precision.
In theory, it has all the energy and freedom of the British
and Roman governments, without their defects, In short, the
privilges of freemen are [55] .interwoven into the feelings and
habits of the Americans ; liberty stands on the immoveable
basis of a general distribution of property and diffusion of
knowledge ; but the Americans must cease to contend, to fear,
and to hate, before they can realize the benefits of indepen-
dence and government, or enjoy the blessings, which heaven
has lavished, in rich profusion, upon this western world.
[* " This proves how little dependence can be placed on theory Twelve
years experience, or four elections demonstrates the contrary." — Note in
author's copy. — P. L. f.]
1 C vxft
Live Music
Archive
Librivox
Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland
Museum of Art
Internet
Arcade
Console Living Room
Open Library
American
Libraries
TV News
Understanding
9/11